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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW 
Courts have traditionally been wary of plaint!!fs who bring ac-
tions for negligent infliction of emotional distress. For various 
policy reasons, jurisdictions have imposed standards that plain-
t!lfs must satisfy prior to bringing an action. This comment 
traces the origin and development of these standards, evaluates 
their success in protecting deserving plaint!!fs, and projects the 
future course oj the tort. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As Anglo-American society moved from an agrarian to an indus-
trial age, considerable litigation followed from the multitude of acci-
dents attendant such a shift. Negligent rather than intentional mis-
conduct became the dominant source of litigation and courts were 
forced to reformulate their rules of liability. To provide consistent and 
workable guidelines, courts sometimes sacrificed fairness for founda-
tion. Since courts met new causes of action with stubborn resistance, 
plaintiffs were forced to plead their cases in conjunction with an estab-
lished tort. When courts grudgingly accepted new causes of action, 
they designed arbitrary rules to define narrowly the scope of liability. 
It was in this environment that the tort of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress had its genesis. Its development has been marked by a 
series of arbitrary standards, such as the iinpact, zone of danger, and 
foreseeability rules, each of which is more progressive than its prede-
cessor and designed to provide a workable solution for adjudicating 
emotional injury cases. 
This comment traces the development of the various rules con-
cerning negligent infliction of emotional distress, with special emphasis 
on third party bystander cases. It critically analyzes the rules and offers 
a projection of the future status of the law and discusses the current 
and projected state of the law in Maryland. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Despite the early acceptance of damages for assault, 1 the law has 
been reluctant to redress injuries for non-physical invasions.2 This re-
I. One of the earliest recorded cases is I. deS. et ux v. W. deS., Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, f. 99 
pl. 60 (1348), noted in C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORTS 918-19 (2d ed. 1969), where damages were recovered by a women who 
narrowly escaped injury by a hatchet thrown by the defendant. The court stated: 
"There is harm, and a trespass for which they shall recover damages, since he 
made an assault upon the woman, as it is found although he did no other harm." 
2. A particularly hostile attitude can be found in Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 
548, 61 A. 1022 (1905): 
All of these cases are of recent and unhealthy growth, and none of them 
stands squarely on the ancient ways. In the last half century the ingenu-
ity of counsel, stimulated by the cupidity of clients and encouraged by 
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luctance has been more pronounced when the misconduct is negligent 
rather than intentional. 3 
In an 1861 English case4 that exemplified the nineteenth century 
judicial attitude, Lord Wensleydale flatly stated: "[m]ental pain or 
anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress when the 
unlawful act complained of causes that alone."5 With few exceptions6 
the common law was in agreement.7 Emotional harm was regarded as 
too metaphysical and evanescent for courts to contemplate. 8 The rea-
sons most frequently stated by courts for denying recovery include: 
(1) damages are too speculative;9 (2) fraud may be easily committed; 10 
(3) injury is outside the bounds of proximate cause; 11 and ( 4) great in-
the prejudices of juries, has expanded the action for negligence until it 
overtops all others in frequency and importance; but it is only in the very 
end of that period that it has been stretched to the effort to cover so 
intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory, and so speculative a cause of 
action as mere mental disturbance. It requires but a brief judicial expe-
rience to be convinced of the large proportion of exaggeration, and even 
of actual fraud, in the ordinary action for physical injuries from negli-
gence; and if we opened the door to this new invention the result would 
be great danger, if not disaster, to the cause of practical justice. 
ld. at 550-51, 61 A. at 1023. This passage was later condemned as "an unjust 
attack on our whole judicial system." Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 177, 142 
A.2d 263, 271 (1958) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). 
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 54 (4th ed. 1971). 
4. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577 (1861), noted in Goodrich, Emotional Distur-
bance As Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497, 497 (1922). 
5. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598 (1861), noted in Goodrich, supra note 4, at 
497. 
6. Dean Prosser noted the exceptions of negligent transmissions of messages by tele-
gram companies and negligent mishandling of corpses. W. PROSSER, supra note 
3, § 54, at 329-30. In addition, parents were able to recover damages for mental 
anguish caused by the seduction of their daughter. See, e.g., Dwire v. Steams, 44 
N.D. 199, 172 N.W. 69 (1919); Andrews v. Askey, 173 Eng. Rep. 376 (1837). 
7. One author has suggested that no damages could be recovered for mental distress 
partly because of the "practical impossibility of administering any other rule," 
since at common law parties were incompetent to testify. Bohlen, Right to Recover 
for Injury Resulting From Negligence Without Impact, 50 U. PA. L. REv. 141, 143 
(1902). 
8. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 94 (3d ed. 1906) ("mere 
mental pain and anguish are too vague for legal redress where no injury is done to 
person, property, health or reputation"); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, §54, at 329. 
9. St. Louis I.M. & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42, 104 S.W. 551 (1907); Cleveland 
C.C. & St.L. Ry. v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900); Nelson v. 
Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 
N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900). 
10. Morse v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361 (1903); Nelson v. Craw-
ford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 
N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900). 
ll. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 
65 N.J.L. 383,47 A. 561 (1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 
354 (1896); Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 
(1898); Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Trans. Co., 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4 (1909); 
Ewing v. Pittsburg, C.C. & St.L. Ry., 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892). 
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crease in litigation would ensue. 12 Since no independent recovery 
could be had in an action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, 13 a plaintiff was required to show some physical injury in connec-
tion with his emotional injury. With some exceptions, courts were slow 
to realize that emotional shock could produce bodily reactions resulting 
in physical injury. Therefore, damages for emotional distress, labeled 
"parasitic" 14 because of their attachment to a recognized tort, were first 
recovered under the impact rule, the first in a series of limitations on 
the ability of a plaintiff to recover damages. 
A. The Impact Rule 
By requiring that a physical impact accompany an emotional in-
jury, courts hoped to provide a definitive test that would preclude, or at 
least limit, contrived claims. A plaintiff could easily prove the exist-
ence or non-existence of an impact, and courts felt that severe emo-
tional harm was more likely to occur when the plaintiff suffered a 
physical blow. The impact rule was first established in England in 1888 
in Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 15 and despite its short 
life there, it has stubbornly survived in this country. In Coultas, the 
gatekeeper of a railway company negligently invited the plaintiffs to 
drive their buggy over a level crossing when it was unsafe to do so. A 
train approached and the buggy barely made it across without being 
struck. In reversing an award for damages, the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council held that the damage sustained by the plaintiffs be-
cause of the fright was too remote. 16 
The case was immediately criticized by other courts. While Coul-
tas held that as a matter of law injury is not the ordinary consequence 
12. Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897); Spade v. 
Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 
Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 
A. 561 (1900). Other courts denied recovery because of the lack of precedent. 
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 (1896); Lehman v. 
Brooklyn City R.R., 54 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 355 (1888); Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. 
Coultas, l3 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888). For criticism of the traditional reasons 
against recovery, see Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REv·. 260 
(1921). 
13. The term is a logical outgrowth of intentional infliction of emotional distress. As 
in the case with negligent infliction of emotional distress, damages for intentional 
infliction were first recovered as "parasitic damages." See Prosser, Insult and Out-
rage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 40-41 (1956). 
14. l T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1980 ed.): 
I d. 
The treatment of any element of damages as a parasitic factor be-
longs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which 
is to-day recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized 
as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social, 
economic and industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the organic 
law. 
15. 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888). 
16. Id. at 225. 
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of fright, an Irish court 17 held that this issue should be left to the jury. 
Two English cases18 distinguished Coultas, and it was overruled in 
1901 by Dulieu v. White & Sons. 19 Between its adoption in Coultas, and 
its demise in Dulieu, however, the impact rule was adopted by New 
York in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway, 20 and Massachusetts in Spade v. 
Lynn & Boston Railroad 21 
Mitchell perhaps best represents the impact rule, echoing all of the 
traditional arguments against recovery.22 In Mitchell, the plaintiff was 
standing upon a crosswalk when a team of horses belonging to the de-
fendant raced towards her. ·Although she was not struck, the horses 
came so close that the plaintiff stood between their heads when they 
were finally stopped. Medical testimony was offered at trial to prove 
that the miscarriage the plaintiff suffered was the proximate result of 
her shock and fright. The Court of Appeals of New York held that 
without impact the plaintiff lacked a cause of action. 
The basic premise of Mitchell was that since a plaintiff could not 
recover for mere fright, she could not recover for any injuries resulting 
from fright. 23 In addition, the court denied recovery because the dam-
ages were too remote to lie in the bounds of proximate cause. 24 The 
Mitchell court also combined the traditional fear of fraud and in-
creased litigation arguments into a loosely defined public policy 
argument. 25 
In contrast to Mitchell, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Rallroad 26 argued the impact rule al-
17. Bell v. Great N. Ry., 26 L.R. Ir. 428 (1890). 
18. Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57; Pugh v. London B. & S.C. Ry., [1896] 2 
Q.B. 248. Wilkinson is one of the leading cases on intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In Wilkinson, the defendant, a practical joker, told the plaintiff 
that her husband had been injured in an accident and that she was to take two 
pillows and go in a taxi to get him. Recovery was allowed; the court refused to 
follow Coultas because of Pugh and Bell, and also because Coultas did not in-
volve a willful act. 
19. [1901] 2 K.B. 669. 
20. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
21. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
22. 'See supra text accompanying notes 9-12. 
23. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896). 
24. The Mitchell court stated: 
Moreover, it cannot be properly said that the plaintiffs miscarriage 
was the proximate result of the defendant's negligence. Proximate dam-
ages are such as are the ordinary and natural results of the negligence 
charged, and those that are usual, and may, therefore, be expected. It is 
quite obvious that the plaintiffs injuries do not fall within the rule as to 
proximate damages. The injuries to the plaintiff were plainly the result 
of an accidental or unusual combination of circumstances, which could 
not have been reasonably anticipated, and over which the defendant had 
no control, and hence her damages were too remote to justify a recovery 
in this action. 
/d. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. 
25. /d. 
26. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
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most exclusively from an expediency viewpoint.27 In Spade, while the 
defendant's conductor was removing a drunken passenger from a train, 
the conductor jostled another drunken passenger who fell onto the 
plaintiff. Although the fall itself did not harm the plaintiff, she alleged 
physical injury because of her fright. The Spade court conceded that a 
psychic injury could be the direct and immediate consequence of negli-
gence and that fear could produce physical injuries that could flow 
proximately from negligence,28 but claimed that it was impossible to 
administer satisfactorily any rule other than the impact rule.29 More-
over, while the physical consequences of emotional injuries are direct, 
the court held that they are not foreseeable to the defendant. 30 The 
court stated that "the general conduct of business and of the ordinary 
affairs of life, must be done on the assumption that persons who are 
liable to be affected thereby are not peculiarly sensitive."31 The opin-
ion conceded the injustice of the rule, but stated "[t]he logical vindica-
tion . . . is that it is unreasonable to hold persons who are merely 
negligent bound to anticipate and guard against fright and the conse-
quences of fright, and that this would open a wide door for unjust 
claims, which could not successfully be met."32 Although it listed cases 
contrary to the impact rule, the Spade court did not criticize or attempt 
to distinguish them. 33 
Although most states adopted the impact rule, it did not escape 
judicial scrutiny. For example, the English case of Dulieu v. White & 
Sons 34 criticized both Mitchell and Spade. Although Mitchell asserted 
that damages arising from emotional trauma were too remote to be 
proximately caused, Dulieu disagreed. The Dulieu court suspected that 
physical injuries are often the direct consequence of emotional injury.35 
Later courts36 and commentators37 were less equivocal and pointed to 
27. In 1899, Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
stated: "The point decided in Spade . . . is not put as a logical deduction from 
the general principles of liability in tort, but as a limitation of those principles 
upon purely practical grounds." Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 
577-78, 55 N.E. 380, 380 (1899). 
28. Spade, 168 Mass. at 288, 47 N.E. at 88-89. 
29. /d. at 288, 47 N.E. at 89. 
30. /d. at 289, 47 N.E. at 89. 
31. /d. 
32. /d. at 290, 47 N.E. at 89 (emphasis supplied). 
33. The Spade court cited three cases: Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 
N.W. 1034 (1892); Fitzpatrick v. Great W. Ry., 12 U.C.Q.B. 645 (Hilary Term, 18 
Vic.); Bell v. Great N. Ry., 26 L.R. Ir. 428 (1890). Spade, 168 Mass. at 290, 47 
N.E. at 89. 
34. [1901] 2 K.B. 669. 
35. /d. at 677. 
36. See Bourhill v. Young, 1943 A.C. 92, 103, in which the court stated: "the distinc-
tion between mental shock and bodily injury was never a scientific one, for mental 
shock is presumably in all cases the result of, or at least accompanied by, some 
physical disturbance in the sufferer's system." See also Chiuchiolo v. New Eng-
land Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930). 
37. See Goodrich, supra note 4, at 498-503; Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury And 
Disease: Legal Liability For Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 212-16 (1944). 
140 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 14 
medical evidence that confirmed Dulieu's suspicion. Because Spade 
shared this belief, the court in Dulieu criticized Spade for adhering to 
the impact rule despite its questionable foundation. 38 
Dulieu also disagreed with Mitchell's premise that since a plaintiff 
could not bring an action for fright, then he could not recover damages 
for fright. 39 According to Dulieu, injury is the basis for an action and 
as long as there is physical injury, fright is actionable.40 There can be 
injury without impact and impact without injury. This part of Mitch-
ell's holding was also criticized as being both illogical and contrary to 
common law.41 A traditional reason for not allowing recovery for 
fright alone was that damages were regarded as too speculative for 
measurement.42 When physical injuries are directly traceable to fright, 
however, these measurement problems do not exist.43 And, as Dulieu 
noted, the jury would not encounter greater difficulty in determining 
the effects of nervous shock through fright without impact than when 
there was impact.44 Dulieu, which was particularly unsympathetic to 
the public policy arguments of Mitchell and Spade, 45 stated: "[s)uch a 
course involves the denial of redress in meritorious cases and it neces-
sarily implies a certain degree of distrust, which I do not share, in the 
capacity of legal tribunals to get at the truth in this class of claim."46 
Some later courts, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland, an-
swered Mitchell and Spade with a countervailing public policy that a 
remedy should exist for every substantial wrong.47 
As dissatisfaction with the impact rule increased, courts that 
38. [1901) 2 K.B. at 681. 
39. Id. at 673. 
40. Id. at 673-74. 
41. E.g., Bohlen, supra note 7, at 152; Lambert, Tort Liability for Psychic Injuries, 41 
B.U.L. REv. 584, 589 (1961); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the 
Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1936); McNiece, Psychic Injury and 
Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REV. I, 26 ( 1949); Smith, supra note 
37, at 208 n.34; Throckmorton, supra note 12, at 266. 
42. For a criticism of the traditional rationale, see Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. 
Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 320, 73 So. 205, 207 (1916). 
43. The Alabama Fuel court explained this distinction in the following terms: 
Damages, when confined to fright alone, is [sic) dealing with a meta-
physical, as contradistinguished from a physical condition, with some-
thing subjective instead of objective, and entirely within the realm of 
speculation. So the damages suffered where the only manifestation is 
fright are too subtle and speculative to be capable of admeasurement by 
any standard known to the law; but when the damages are physical and 
objective as consequent upon the physical pain and incapacity mani-
fested by and ensuing upon a miscarriage, the damages are quite as ca-
pable of being measured by a jury as if they had ensued from an impact 
or blow. 
Id. at 320, 73 So. at 207. 
44. Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901) 2 K.B. 669, 681. 
45. Id. at 680-81. 
46. Id. at 681. 
47. See, e.g., Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 403-04, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933); Lam-
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honored stare decisis attempted to mitigate its harshness. Some courts, 
including those of New York and Massachusetts, construed the facts to 
satisfy the requirements of the impact rule.48 This led to strained re-
sults; occurrences such as dust in the eyes49 and smoke inhalation50 
constituted sufficient impact for recovery.51 The eagerness of courts to 
find impact may well have led plaintiffs' counsel to falsify the existence 
of an impact. 52 Ironically, courts had designed the impact rule to pre-
vent falsification of claims. In sharp contrast to the cases allowing re-
covery for the slightest impact is Bosley v. Andrews, 53 a 1958 decision 
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Although the plaintiff alleged 
nervous shock and accompanying heart problems as a result of being 
bert v. Brewster, 97 W.Va. 124, 138, 125 S.E. 244, 249 (1924). The Bowman court 
stated: 
It is objected that the effect of fright is subjective, imaginative, conjec-
tural, and speculative, and therefore easily simulated and feigned, so 
that its actual existence is difficult to ascertain, and, if found to exist, is 
inherently insusceptible of compensation by a precise pecuniary stan-
dard. These considerations undeniably tend to multiply fictitious or 
speculative claims, and to open to unscrupulous litigants a wide field for 
exploitation, but these difficulties are common, are surmountable, and so 
should not prevent the operation of the general and fundamental theory 
of the common law that there is a remedy for every substantial wrong. 
Bowman, 164 Md. at 403-04, 165 A. at 184. 
48. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102,92 N.E. 1010 (1910) (plaintiff forcibly 
seated on floor); Homans v. Boston Elev. Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902) 
(plaintiff received slight jolt); Sawyer v. Dougherty, 286 A.D. 1061, 144 N.Y.S.2d 
746 (1955) (plaintiff struck by blast of air filled with glass and wooden splinters); 
Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 23 A.D. 141, 48 N.Y.S. 914 (1897) (plaintiff hit 
on head by light bulb recovered for resulting miscarriage). Having lost the first 
time because of the impact rule, the plaintiff in Spade brought a second suit alleg-
ing impact. The court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, avoided the impact issue 
and denied recovery on an assumption of risk theory. Spade v. Lynn & Boston 
R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1899). For additional New York decisional law 
falling within the slight impact category, see McNiece, supra note 41, at 51-58. 
For additional Massachusetts cases and a general discussion on this point, see 
Smith, supra note 37, at 300-02; see also Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo. App. 4, 12 
(1901) ("courts which deny relief for injuries following fright, are so impressed 
with the injustice of the rule that they seize on any pretext to allow a recovery-
even the most frivolous legal wrong and however slight the immediate harm may 
be"). 
49. Porter v. Delaware L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906). 
50. Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930). But see Davis v. Cleve-
land Ry., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E.2d 169 (1939) (impact must be sufficiently 
severe by itself for plaintiff to sue in negligence). 
51. In one case, a circus horse "evacuated its bowels" onto the lap of an unsuspecting 
patron. Instead of abolishing the rule, the court allowed recovery on the basis of 
impact when it was clear that the plaintiffs emotional injury had nothing to do 
with the force of the impact. See Christy Bros. v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 
S.E. 680 (1928). 
52. One commentator noted that it would be no more difficult to fabricate the exist-
ence of a slight impact than to falsify a claim involving no impact at all. 
McNiece, supra note 41, at 31 n.99. 
53. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958). 
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chased by a bull, Bosley denied a cause of action because there was no 
impact. 
In New York, which did not abandon the impact rule untill961,54 
various methods were used to circumvent the rule,55 including a nui-
sance theory56 and a slight variation on the impact rule, the contempo-
raneous injury rule.57 The contemporaneous injury rule was applied 
where fright alone caused the plaintiff to suffer a physical injury, not 
from within his body nor due to a defendant's "impact," but as a result 
of an automatic, startled reaction, such as jumping off a carriage negli-
gently placed in the path of an oncoming train. 58 In Comstock v. Wil-
son, 59 the plaintiff's automobile was slightly jolted when struck by the 
defendent's vehicle. The plaintiff got out of her automobile in an ex-
cited manner, and while writing down the defendant's license number, 
she fell, fractured her skull, and died within a few minutes. The Com-
stock court apparently did not base its decision allowing recovery on 
the impact from the collision, but instead applied the contemporaneous 
injury rule.60 
Rather than employ circuitous methods, other courts were more 
direct.61 By the time the Court of Apgeals of New York had over-
ruled62 Mitchell v. Rochester Railway, 3 the impact rule had largely 
54. Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), overrol-
ing Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
55. See Lambert, supra note 41, at 593-97. 
56. Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509,58 N.E.2d 517 (1944). For a 
suggestion that the law of nuisance was expanded elsewhere to protect peace of 
mind, see Goodrich, supra note 4, at 5ll-l2. 
57. See, e.g., Cameron v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 182 Mass. 310, 65 N.E. 385 
(1902) (plaintiff, suffering injuries from fright caused by negligently exploded dy-
namite, started to rise and then fainted and fell); Muncy v. Levy Bros. Realty Co., 
184 A.D. 467, 170 N.Y.S. 994 (1918) (plaintiff, frightened by the noise and vibra-
tion of a heavy door falling down an elevator shaft, fell and suffered a miscar-
riage); Ansteth v. Buffalo Ry. Co., 145 N.Y. 210, 39 N.E. 708 (1895) (child stealing 
a ride on defendant's streetcar was frightened when the conductor yelled "Hey!," 
lost his grip, and fell under the streetcar, which crushed one of his legs). 
58. Twomley v. Central P.N. & E.R.R.R., 69 N.Y. 158 (1877). 
59. 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931). 
60. On several occasions the New York courts used the contemporaneous injury rule 
to distinguish Mitchel/. See, e.g., Schacter v. Interborough R.T., 70 Misc. 558, 127 
N.Y.S. 308 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 146 A.D. 139, 130 N.Y.S. 549 (Sup. 
Ct. 1911); Maloney v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 229 A.D. 317,241 N.Y.S. 160 (Sup. 
Ct. 1930). For an excellent discussion of Mitchell and subsequent New York deci-
sional law, see McNiece, supra note 41. 
61. E.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916); 
Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Green v. T.A. Shoe-
maker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 
134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 
329, 150 A. 540 (1930); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890). For 
collections of cases on the impact rule, see Smith, supra note 37, at 207-08 nn. 31-
32; Annot., 11 A.L.R. lll9 (1921). 
62. Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), overrol-
ing Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
63. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
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been rejected in favor of the zone of danger rule.64 
B. The Zone of Danger Rule and the Bystander 
The zone of danger rule, which originated in Dulieu v. White & 
Sons, 65 attempted to provide an answer to judicial skepticism at emo-
tional injury claims. By requiring a plaintiff to be situated where he 
would reasonably fear physical injury, courts abolished the actual im-
pact requirement but still addressed fears of false or exaggerated 
claims. What began as a liberalization of a plaintiff's right to recover, 
however, was also construed as a restriction. The rule as stated in Du-
lieu, known as "Kennedy's dictum," prevented a plaintiff from recover-
ing damages for emotional injury if he feared for another but not for 
himself.66 Despite this limitation, though, the first cases to consider the 
issue allowed recovery for damages caused by fear for another when 
the plaintiff was within the zone of physical danger. 
In Hambrook v. Stokes, 67 the defendant's negligently unattended 
lorry ran down a narrow road. The plaintiff's wife saw the truck and 
feared for her children who she thought were on the road on their way 
to school.68 She suffered a miscarriage and died. The husband alleged 
that his wife feared for her safety, or alternatively, for the safety of 
their children.69 The owner of the lorry defended on the basis of Ken-
nedy's dictum.70 The court determined it was irrelevant to decide for 
whose safety the wife feared, and thus allowed the husband to 
recover.71 
64. Only three jurisdictions retain the impact rule. See Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 
348 (Fla. App.), appeal docketed, No. 62,830 (Fla. Nov. 5, 1982); Indiana Motor-
cycle Ass'n v. Hudson, 399 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. App. 1980); Deutsch v. Schein, 597 
S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980). Illinois and Missouri recently abolished the impact rule. 
Rickey v. Chicago Trans. Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983); Bass v. 
Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983). For a discussion of Champion v. Gray 
see Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress-Should the Florida Supreme 
Court Replace the Impact Rule with a Foreseeability Analysis?, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. 
REV. 229 (1983). 
65. [1901] 2 K.B. 669. Interestingly, the Dulieu court never used the term "zone of 
danger." 
66. The Dulieu opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, stated: 
There is, I am inclined to think, at least one limitation. The shock, 
where it operates through the mind, must be a shock which arises from a 
reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself. A. has, I con-
ceive, no legal duty, not to shock B.'s nerves by the exhibition of negli-
gence towards C. 
/d. at 675. This limitation had its origin in an unreported English decision, Smith 
v. Johnson & Co., cited in Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, 61. 
67. [1925] 1 K.B. 141. 
68. One child was actually run over by the truck. The court apparently did not con-
sider that fact important to the issue of liability. See Magruder, supra note 41, at 
1039. 
69. Hambrook v. Stokes, (1925] I K.B. 141, 147. 
70. /d. at 145. 
71. The Hambrook court stated: 
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A Maryland case, Bowman v. Williams, 72 is factually analogous to 
and is often cited in connection with Hamhrook. In Bowman, a run-
away truck collided into the basement of the plaintiffs house. It was 
unclear whether the plaintiff, who watched the collision from upstairs, 
feared for his own safety or for that of his two young children who 
were playing in the basement at the time. The defendants contended 
that the father could not recover for his physical injuries resulting from 
fright unless his fright was for his own safety.73 The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland rejected this argument, citing Hamhrook v. Stokes. 74 Like 
Hamhrook, Bowman indicated that the plaintiff was within the zone of 
danger.75 Cases subsequent to Bowman have been inconsistent in 
awarding damages to a plaintiff within the zone whose emotional in-
jury was caused by fear for another.76 
When a plaintiff is outside the zone of danger, courts have been 
more reluctant to allow recove~l" The first case to squarely address the 
issue,77 Wauhe v. Warrington, 7 denied a cause of action on the basis 
I can find no principle to support the self-imposed restriction stated in 
the judgment of Kennedy J. in Du/ieu v. White & Sons, that the shock 
must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate per-
sonal injury to oneself. It appears to be inconsistent with [earlier deci-
sions]. It would result in a state of the law in which a mother, shocked 
by fright for herself, would recover, while a mother shocked by her child 
being killed before her eyes, could not, and in which a mother traversing 
the highway with a child in her arms could recover if shocked by fright 
for herself while if she could be cross-examined into an admission that 
the fright was really for her child, she could not. 
Id. at 157 (footnotes omitted). 
72. 164 Md. 357, 165 A. 182 (1933). 
73. Id. at 400, 165 A. at 183. 
74. Id. at 401-02, 165 A. at 183-84. 
75. The court of appeals in Bowman explained: 
Here there was imminent danger of physical contact that confronted the 
plaintiff, who had visible reason to apprehend that the impending peril 
caused by the negligent act or omission of the defendants' servants with 
respect to their duty to him would not only happen but would also crush 
and damage the building and inflict the threatened physical injury upon 
his children in the basement and himself in the dining room of the 
house. There was no basis to differentiate the fear caused to the plaintiff 
for himself and for his children, because there is no possibility of divi-
sion of an emotion which was instantly evoked by the common and si-
multaneous danger of the three. 
Id. at 403, 165 A. at 184. 
76. Compare Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (1957) (allowing 
recovery) and Greenberg v. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958) (same) 
with Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956) 
(denying recovery). 
77. In a 1912 case, a bystander outside the zone of danger recovered damages but the 
court did not directly consider the issue. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 
58 So. 927 (1912). In Spearman, the plaintiff and her husband had just stepped 
from their mule drawn buggy when the defendant's negligent operation of his 
automobile frightened the mule and caused it to run away with two of the p1ain-
ti.lrs children still inside the buggy. The plaintiff alleged physical injury caused 
by her emotional distress at the thought of injury to her children. The court was 
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that no duty is owed to a bystander outside the zone of danger.79 In 
Waube, the plaintiffs wife suffered shock and died as a result of seeing 
her daughter struck by an automobile, though the mother was not her-
self in danger of being struck. The court held that because of the re-
mote possibility that a third person would be emotionally injured by a 
defendant's careless use of his automobile, allowing recovery would 
subject the defendant to disproportionate liability, and would allow 
fraudulent claims and unlimited liability.80 
In reaching its decision, the Waube court was sharply critical of 
the 1925 English decision, Hambrook v. Stokes. 81 Although Hambrook 
indicated that it considered the plaintiff within the zone of danger, the 
court implied that its decision was not based on this factor. Rather, the 
court advocated a traditional negligence approach, based on foresee-
ability and proximate cause, instead of an arbitrary zone based on pol-
icy considerations, to determine the basis for liability in bystander 
cases. 82 Of the two cases, later decisions sided with Waube. 83 
Following Waube, the zone of danger rule remained unscathed for 
over thirty years.84 The same public policy considerations that failed to 
sustain the impact rule were embraced by courts wary of increasing 
litigation. Although clearly the majority rule, the zone of danger rule 
may have reached its apogee in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply 
Co., 85 a decision by the Supreme Court of California. 
In Amaya, the court denied a cause of action to a mother who saw 
her son run over by a truck. In a paradigm expression of the policy-
aware of "Kennedy's dictum" since it cited IJulieu v. White & Sons in connection 
with another matter, but it did not address, and apparently the parties did not 
argue, the status of the plaintiff-bystander. 
78. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). 
79. /d. at 605, 258 N.W. at 497-98. 
80. /d. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501. 
81. [1925] I K.B. 141. Waube, which held that Hambrook's majority mistakenly ap-
proached the case from the standpoint of proximate cause, adopted the reasoning 
of the dissent in Hambrook. The Hambrook dissent stated that it would be a 
considerable and unwarranted extension of the duty of vehicle owners towards 
others in or near the highway to include an obligation not to do anything to 
render them liable to harm through nervous shock caused by the sight or appre-
hension of damage to third persons. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 611,258 
N.W. 497, 500 (1935) (quoting Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925) I K.B. 141, 163). 
82. [ 1925] l K.B. 141, 153. 
83. In a Maryland case that is perhaps the most often cited decision in connection 
with Waube, a mother saw her two daughters struck and killed by a vehicle. 
Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952). The court denied the 
mother a cause of action in an opinion similar to that in Waube. For a further 
discussion of Resavage, see infra notes 152-62 and accompanying text. For a list-
ing of cases denying recovery to a plaintiff outside the zone of danger, see Amaya 
v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 304, 379 P.2d 513, 528, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 33, 38 (1963). 
84. The Supreme Court of California was the first jurisdiction explicitly to reject the 
zone of danger rule. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 
(1968). For a discussion of Dillon, see infra text accompanying notes 99-104. 
85. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). 
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based duty argument versus the traditional negligence approach, the 
Amaya court held that "the negligence issue, i.e., the violation of 
duty,"86 is for the court and not the jury to decide. Otherwise, were 
liability defined solely in terms of foreseeability, a jury question would 
arise since reasonable minds might differ as to whether an injury is 
foreseeable.87 The court took the following view of duty: "[d]uty is 
only a word with which we state our conclusion . . . .''88 The court 
indicated that foreseeability of harm is only one factor to be considered 
in forming that conclusion.89 With respect to the "administrative fac-
tor," the Amaya court stated that the problems of proof remained due 
to inadequate medical knowledge,90 and expressed the difficulty in de-
termining the time and space requirements the plaintiff's presence must 
satisfy in relation to the accident.91 Under its "socio-economic and 
moral factor" analysis, the court argued that the insurance system 
could not adequately and fairlr absorb the costs of liability,92 and reit-
erated Waube v. Warrington's 9 position that a defendant's liability to a 
plaintiff outside the zone of danger would be disproportionate to his 
wrong.94 
The Amaya decision provoked a lengthy dissent that argued the 
lack of foundation of the policy considerations underlying the major-
ity's notion of duty.95 The dissent, which took an approach to duty 
based on foreseeability,96 reasoned that an emotionally injured by-
stander is not an unforeseeable plaintiff.97 Five years later the 
86. Id. at 308, 379 P.2d at 521, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41. 
87. /d. at 308, 379 P.2d at 520, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 40. 
88. /d. at 308, 379 P.2d at 521,29 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (quoting Prosser, Palsgrcif Revisited, 
52 MICH. L. REV. l, 15 (1953)). 
89. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 310, 379 P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42. 
90. /d. at 311, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43. For support, the opinion cited 
Smith, supra note 37. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 312, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 
43; cf. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) (modern medical science 
can show causal link between event and emotional distress). 
91. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 312-13, 379 P.2d at 523-24,29 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44. The time 
and space requirements considered by the Amaya court were suggested by Dean 
Prosser in W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 182 (2d ed. 1955), 
and were adopted by California in 1968. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 
441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968); see infra note 102 and accompany-
ing text. 
92. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 314, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45. 
93. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). 
94. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d at 315,379 P.2d at 525,29 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Gibson, C.J., Peters 
& Peek, J.J., dissenting). 
95. /d. at 324-31, 379 P.2d at 531-35, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 51-55. 
96. Id. at 323-24, 379 P.2d at 530, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 50. 
97. In a much cited opinion, Judge Cardozo stated that the plaintiffs presence, not 
just his injury, must be foreseeable. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 
162 N.E. 99 (1928). Both Amaya and Wauhe took the position that an emotion-
ally injured bystander is an unforeseeable plaintiff. Amaya, 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 
P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 
497 (1935); see also Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (same). 
Although Wauhe relied on Palsgrcif for support, one source suggests that another 
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Supreme Court of California adopted the position of Amaya's dissent 
in Dillon v. Legg, 98 the first case to reject the zone of danger rule in 
favor of the foreseeability standard. 
C The Foreseeability Rule 
1. Dillon v. Legg99 
Dillon provided the Supreme Court of California with the ideal 
factual setting for abandoning the zone of danger rule. The case in-
volved two plaintiffs, one arguably within the zone of danger, and the 
other clearly not. The plaintiffs, a mother and one daughter, witnessed 
the death of another family member caused by the defendant's automo-
bile. The Dillon court held that it would be fundamentally unfair to 
allow a cause of action in one case but not in the other. Assuming 
impact is not necessary, reasoned the court, the zone of danger rule 
must fail because its only justification is that one within the zone will 
fear the danger of impact. 100 Dillon attacked the traditional arguments 
against recovery and, because of the lack of precedent, relied on Eng-
lish decisions, principally Hambrook v. Stokes. 101 Despite its formula-
tion of a reasonable foreseeability test as the sole criterion for liability, 
the court added "factors" to be considered for recovery: 102 (1) the 
plaintiff must be situated near the accident; (2) shock must result from 
a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from a contemporary ob-
decision, Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921) (Car-
dozo, J.), is more on point. See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN,supra note l, at 998. 
In Wagner, the plaintiffs brother was thrown from the defendant's train. The 
train stopped, and plaintiff alighted and walked along a trestle to a bridge in an 
effort to find his brother. The plaintiff missed his footing and fell. The court said: 
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The 
law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its 
consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects 
within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils 
life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. 
The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that 
falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid. 
Wagner, 232 N.Y. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437-38 (citations omitted). In a recent Eng-
lish decision, the court partially relied on the rescue analogy in rejecting the zone 
of danger rule, and quoted an excerpt from the above passage. McLoughlin v. 
O'Brian, 1983 A.C. 410. 
98. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (Tobriner, J.). Although 
Justice Peters authored the dissent in Amaya, he quoted the district court of ap-
peal decision in its entirety except for its statement of facts. Amaya v. Home Ice, 
Fuel & Supply Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1962) (Tobriner, J.), quoted in Amaya, 59 
Cal. 2d 295, 320-32, 379 P.2d 513, 528-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 48-56 ( 1963) (Peters, 
J., dissenting). The district court of appeal decision, and the opinion in IJillon, 
were authored by Justice Tobriner. 
99. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
100. Id. at 133, 41 P.2d at 915, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 75. 
101. Id. at 744-46, 441 P.2d at 422-24, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 82-84. 
102. I d. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The IJillon court stated that the 
reasonable foreseeability test should be applied on a case-by-case basis. 
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servance of the accident and; (3) the plaintiff and the victim must be 
closely related. Though not necessarily couched in mandatory 
terms, 103 the Dillon factors have been strictly applied by most courts 
amenable to the foreseeability standard both in California and 
elsewhere. 104 
Several states, 105 including New York in Tobin v. Grossman, 106 re-
jected Dillon's approach and clung to the zone of danger rule. In 
Tobin, a mother who did not witness the accident, but heard the 
screech of automobile brakes, ran from her home to see her two year 
old child lying seriously injured in the road. The Tobin court rejected 
the mother's action for mental pain and suffering on the basis that "the 
indirect harm" of emotional injury is the "risk of living and bearing 
children."107 The court, which was concerned with the possibility of 
imposing unlimited liability, felt that the Dillon requirements would 
not restrain the bounds of liability and predicted that Dillon's contem-
poraneous observance requirement would soon disappear. 108 
Archibald v. Braverman, 109 a California case decided three months 
after Tobin, apparently abandoned Dillon's contemporaneous obser-
vance requirement. That California was not headed toward unlimited 
liability, however, is apparent from subsequent decisions. Several 
court of appeal decisions refused to give much credence to Archi-
bald 11° Krouse v. Graham, 111 the first Supreme Court of California 
decision after Dillon to discuss the issue, affirmed the contemporaneous 
observance requirement, although it extended "observance" to mean 
103. /d. at 741, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. 
104. See, e.g., McGovern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn. Supp. 225, 372 A.2d 989 (1976); Gustaf-
son v. Paris. 67 Mich. App. 363, 241 N.W.2d 208 (1976); Perlmutter v. Whitney, 
60 Mich. App. 268, 230 N.W.2d 390 (1975). 
105. E.g., Welsh v. Davis, 307 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mont. 1969); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 
N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968) (per curiam); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 
249 N.E.2d 414, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 
N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) 
(dictum), overruled in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Shelton v. 
Russel Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Guilmette v. Alexan-
der, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 
P.2d 291 (1976). 
106. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). 
107. /d. at 619, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62. For a suggestion that New 
York may be moving from Tobin towards .Dillon, see Simons, Psychic Injury and 
the Bystander: The Transcontinental .Dispute Between California and New York, 51 
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 35-39 (1976). 
108. Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 617, 29 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 560. 
109. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). 
llO. See Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 505, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978); 
Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976); 
Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974); Jansen v. Chil-
dren's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1973); Com-
ment, .Duty, Foreseeability and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional .Distress: 
Liability to the Bystander-Recent Developments, 30 MERCER L. REv. 735, 740-41 
(1979). 
Ill. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977). 
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perception through any of the senses, not just through sight. 112 Cases 
subsequent to Krouse have upheld the Dillon requirements. 113 
Some jurisdictions have followed Dl1/on's foreseeability standard 
although it remains the minority rule. 114 For example, in D'Ambra v. 
United States, 115 a mother saw her son struck and killed by a mail 
truck. The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land added a fourth requirement to the Dillon standard: the presence 
of the plaintiff must be foreseeable. 116 Since the federal court decided 
that the mother's presence was foreseeable, it certified a question to the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island asking whether Rhode Island law 
would permit a mother outside the zone of danger to recover damages 
for emotional distress. 117 Because the state court answered in the af-
firmative, it revived the controversy surrounding duty, proximate 
cause, and foreseeability. The D'Ambra court did not adopt a foresee-
ability-alone standard such as Dillon's, but was concerned with policy 
considerations in favor of recovery. 118 It expressed some satisfaction 
112. /d. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872. 
113. See, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 
(1977); Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 
(1980). For a discussion of these decisions and post-Dillon California law, see 
Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging 
from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 {1981). 
114. The Supreme Court of Hawaii was the first appellate court to follow Dillon. Rod-
rigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). Rodrigues, however, did not 
involve a typical bystander outside the zone of danger situation. Rather, the emo-
tional distress was caused by the negligent flooding of the plaintiffs home. But a 
later Hawaii case, Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974), in-
volved the former situation. In Leong, a grandmother saw her grandson struck 
and killed by an automobile. The Supreme Court of Hawaii clearly rejected the 
zone of danger rule. /d. at 408, 520 P.2d at 765. The defendant alleged that the 
grandmother could not recover because of the absence of a blood relationship 
between her and the victim. The Leong court disagreed, partly because of Ha-
waii's unique customs of family living. For other cases following Dillon's ap-
proach, see D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 
(1973); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 
(1981); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Rodrigues v. 
State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 
(Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); 
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Williams v. Citi-
zens Mut. Ins. Co. of America, 94 Mich. App. 762,290 N.W.2d 76 (1980); Toms v. 
McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Corso v. Merrill, 119 
N.H. 647,406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 81 N.J. 88,417 A.2d 521 (1980); 
Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); D' Ambra v. United States, 114 
R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Landreth v. Reed, 540 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1978); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 523 P.2d 1096 (1976). 
115. 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973). 
116. /d. at 819. 
117. See D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643,338 A.2d 524 (1975). 
118. The D'Ambra court listed three policy issues-moral, economic, and administra-
tive-as relevant to the question of whether a plaintiff outside the zone of danger 
can recover damages. D' Am bra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 652, 338 A.2d 524, 
528 (1975). The court found that because of the potential debilitating effects of 
psychic injuries in general and since the plaintiff suffered actual emotional harm 
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with the zone of danger rule, 119 but because of the unique nature of the 
child-mother relationship the court stated it would "deny psychological 
reality" to hold the presence of the mother unforeseeable as a matter of 
law. Iio 
In contrast to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island's approach, 
D'Amico! v. Alvarez Shipping Co. 121 adopted Dillon in its entirety. And 
while the federal court in D'Amhra advocated a detailed, factor-based 
analysis into the foreseeability of a plaintiffs presence, 122 another 
court 123 stated that "when a child is endangered, it is not beyond con-
templation that its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will 
suffer nervous shock." 124 Although courts differed as to whether tore-
quire the foreseeability of a plaintiffs presence, and how that criterion 
should be judged, it was not until 1978 that a court challenged the need 
of the plaintiffs presence at the scene of an accident. 
2. Beyond Dillon 
In 1978, Massachusetts went from one of the most conservative 
jurisdictions to the most liberal in this area. Dziokonski v. Babineau 125 
not only overruled Spade v. Lynn & Boston Railroad's126 impact re-
quirement, but in the process also rejected strict application of Dillon's 
requirements. 
In Dziokonski, a young child was struck by an automobile as she 
walked away from her school bus. Her mother, who arrived at the 
scene shortly after the accident, died as a result of her anguish while en 
route to the hospital with her daughter. In addition, the child's father 
died as a result of the physical and emotional injuries he suffered be-
cause of his daughter's injury and his wife's death. Under a D11lon 
accompanied by physical symptoms, it answered the moral issue in favor of recov-
ery. I d. at 654, 338 A.2d at 529-30. As to the economic issue, IJ'Ambra stated that 
perhaps a driver can best bear the cost of injury since he most likely will be in-
sured. /d. at 654, 338 A.2d at 530. The court was most concerned with the admin-
istrative difficulties of a rule that would allow recovery to one outside the zone. 
Despite this concern, the court held that the zone of danger rule would be relaxed 
when a mother witnesses an injury to her child because of the "overwhelming 
impact of the mother's and child's mental and emotional relationship." /d. at 657, 
338 A.2d at 531. 
119. Id at 656, 338 A.2d at 531. 
120. Id at 657, 338 A.2d at 531. 
121. 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (1973). 
122. The IJ'Ambra court listed the following factors: 
( 1) the age of the child; (2) the type of neighborhood in which the acci-
dent occurred; (3) the familiarity of the tortfeasor with the neighbor-
hood; (4) the time of day; and (5) all other circumstances which would 
have put the tortfeasor on notice of the likely presence of a parent. 
D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 820 (D.R.I. 1975). 
123. Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973). 
124. /d. at 656, 207 N.W.2d at 145 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 353 (3d ed. 1964)). 
125. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). 
126. 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897). 
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approach, the mother would have failed Dillon's second requirement, 
contemporaneous sensory observance, and the father would have failed 
both that criterion and the first requirement, location near the scene of 
the accident. In allowing the administrator of the parents' estates to 
maintain an action for each, the Dziokonski court held that when a 
person negligently injures another through the use of an automobile, it 
is reasonably foreseeable that someone with sufficient emotional at-
tachment to the injured party will be emotionally affected. 127 
Although Dziokonski stated that it is per se reasonably foreseeable 
that a third party will be emotionally affected by a defendant's negli-
gent use of an automobile, it added other requirements to guard against 
unlimited liability. First, the third party must sustain substantial physi-
cal injury and prove that his injury was caused by the defendant's neg-
ligence. 128 Second, liability should depend on several factors, such as 
where, when, and how the injury to the victim entered the plaintiffs 
consciousness, and to what degree a familial or other relationship ex-
isted between the plaintiff and the victim. 129 
Other than Massachusetts, the only other state130 that has allowed 
recovery based on a foreseeability standard without the Dillon require-
ments is Hawaii. In Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 131 the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii construed its earlier decisions to require that 
the Dillon requirements be used as an aid to determine the genuineness 
and degree of mental distress, not as a bar to recovery. 132 
D. Damages Without Physical Injury 
In addition to the requirements of the impact, zone of danger, and 
foreseeability rules, a traditional obstacle for a plaintiff has been the 
need to show a physical injury. One authority has observed that "[t]he 
mere temporary emotion of fright not resulting in physical injury is, in 
contemplation of law, no injury at all, and hence no foundation of an 
127. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978). 
128./d. 
129. /d. 
130. England has also ruled that contemporaneous observance is not a prerequisite to a 
cause of action. McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 1983 A.C. 410 (decided in 1982 and 
previously reported in [1982] 2 W.L.R. 982). In McLoughlin, the plaintiff's hus-
band and their four children were involved in an automobile accident. The plain-
tiff was at home at the time and first learned of the accident two hours later. She 
went to the hospital where she learned that her youngest daughter had been killed 
and that her husband and her other children had been severely injured. The 
plaintiff alleged that she suffered emotional distress and accompanying physical 
injuries. Although Lord Bridge quoted a large portion of Dillon in support of the 
foreseeability standard, he considered Dillon's guidelines to be too rigid. Because 
the plaintiff was so far removed in time and space from the accident, McLoughlin 
represents the most liberal approach to date. 
131. 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981). For a discussion of Campbell see Note, 
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station: Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 4 
HAWAII L. REV. 237 (1982). 
132. /d. at 561-62, 632 P.2d at 1069. 
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action." 133 Until recently, all plaintiffs have had to plead and prove the 
existence, or at least manifestations, of a physical injury; emotional 
tranquility has not been accorded independent legal protection. Dam-
ages for emotional harm have always been parasitic, attached to a rec-
ognized, protected invasion of a plaintiffs physical interest. 
In 1970, the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Rodrigues v. State 134 be-
came the first court to allow recovery in the absence of proof of a physi-
cal injury. The Rodrigues court noted that if emotional distress is 
intentionally inflicted, it is entitled to independent legal protection. 
The court adopted the position in the Restatement (Second) of Torts on 
intentional infliction of emotional distress 135 requiring serious distress, 
and held that "serious mental distress may be found where a reason-
able man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope 
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." 136 
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 137 California abandoned 
the requirement of physical injury. In Molien, the defendant negli-
gently misdiagnosed the plaintiffs wife as having syphilis, and told her 
to inform her husband. Harmful results to their marriage followed. 
Like the Rodrigues court, the Molien court held that sufficient methods 
of proof other than physical injury exist to prove emotional distress. 138 
133. Throckmorton, supra note 12, at 266. 
134. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). 
135. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 246 comment j (1965), states in part: 
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the emotional distress 
has in fact resulted, and where it is severe. Emotional distress passes 
under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental 
or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental 
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarass-
ment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only 
where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tran-
quility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient 
and trival emotional distress is a part of the price of living among peo-
ple. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that 
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. 
136. Rodrigues, 52 Hawaii at 173, 472 P.2d at 520 (1970). This language was later 
adopted by another Hawaii case, Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 570 P.2d 758 
(1974). 
137. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). For a discussion of 
Molien, see Note, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligence Actions for 
Emotional Distress and Loss of Consortium Without Physical Injury, 69 CALIF. L. 
REv. 1142 (1981); Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Hori-
zons After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179 (1981); Note, 
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 
8 PEPPERDlNE L. REv. 817 (1981); Note, Negligent Infliction of Serious Emotional 
Distress is Cognizable in California as an Independent Tort and an Averment of 
Physical Injury is No Longer Necessary to Support the Action; An Alleged Emo-
tional/ njury to a Plaintif.Ts Spouse Will State a Cause of Action for Loss of Consor-
tium by the Plaintiff, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 200 (1981). 
138. The court offered two reasons for not requiring physical manifestations of emo-
tional distress: 
First, the classification is both overinclusive and underinclusive when 
viewed in light of its principal purpose of screening false claims. It is 
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In Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 139 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine overruled a prior decision 140 that required "objective 
symptomatology." Among other reasons, 141 Culbert discarded the re-
quirement of physical manifestations of distress because modern scien-
tific advances have made an emotional injury claim difficult to 
fabricate. 142 Culbert did, however, consider physical manifestations as 
highly persuasive evidence. 143 
Other jurisdictions have followed the reasoning of Culbert. 144 Mis-
souri, in Bass v. Nooney Co., 145 is the most recent state to discard the 
requirements of proof of a physical injury. The Bass court described 
the rule as illogical and arbitrary, 146 and stated that the requirement 
was impractical because of the potential difficulty in distinguishing a 
physical injury from a mental and emotional injury. 147 In lieu of proof 
of physical injury, an emotional injury must be foreseeable, medically 
diagnosable, and of medically significant severity. 148 This trend, how-
ever, has been resisted elsewhere. For example, Massachusetts still ad-
heres to the requirement of proof of a physical injury. 149 
E. Maryland Law 
Maryland refused to accede to the rigidity of the impact rule as 
early as 1909 in Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co. 150 This position, how-
overinclusive in permitting recovery for emotional distress when the suf-
fering accompanies or results in any physical injury whatever, no matter 
how trivial. . . . More significantly, the classification is underinclusive 
because it mechanically denies court access to claims that may well be 
valid and could be proved if the plaintiff were permitted to go to 
trial. . . . The second defect in the requirement of physical injury is 
that it encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony. 
Mo/ien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. 
139. 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). 
140. Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970), overruled in 
Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). 
141. The Culbert court paraphrased the passage fromMolien quoted in supra note 138. 
142. Culbert, 444 A.2d at 437. 
143./d. 
144. E.g., Chapetta v. Bowman Transp. Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Sinn 
v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,404 A.2d 672 (1979). For a discussion of Sinn, see Note, A 
Mother Who Witnesses the Act Which Causes Death or Serious Injury to her Child 
has a Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress. She Need Not 
Herse!f be Within the Zone of Danger Since it is Foreseeable that She Will Suffer 
Mental Trauma, 18 J. FAM. L. 643 (1980); Note, Recovery of Damages for Negli-
gently Caused Emotional Distress Suffered by Bystander Not Precluded Because 
Outside "Zone of Danger," 53 TEMP. L.Q. 944 (1980). 
145. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983). 
146. Id. at 771-72. 
147./d. 
148. /d. at 772-73. 
149. Payton v. Abbot Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). But see Simon v. 
Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 431 N.E.2d 556 (1982) (allowing cause of action when 
emotional distress caused by reckless conduct). 
150. Ill Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909). 
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ever, has not progressed beyond the zone of danger rule. Bowman v. 
Wtl/iams 151 stated that a person's fear need not be for himself. Al-
though the Bowman court believed the plaintiff was in the zone of dan-
ger, it did not indicate whether this fact was dispositive. Despite the 
imprecision of Bowman's holding, the court of appeals construed it in 
Resavage v. Davies 152 to mean that a plaintiff cannot recover if he is 
outside the zone of danger. 
Resavage, because it represents the classic zone of danger by-
stander situation, is frequently cited by other courts. 153 In Resavage, 
while the plaintiff was standing on her front porch, she saw an automo-
bile jump a curb and kill her two daughters. In denying a cause of 
action, the court relied on the Waube-Palsgraf considerations of duty, 
and concluded that no duty extended to the plaintiff. 154 The court dis-
tinguished Bowman on the ground that the plaintiff in Bowman was in 
the zone of danger, 155 and Hambrook v. Stokes 156 on the ground that 
the defendant in that case admitted a breach of duty. 157 
The dissent in Resavage argued not only the undesirability of ap-
plying the zone of danger rule to bystanders, 158 but also that previous 
Maryland decisions mandated that the court not follow the rule. 159 
The dissent contended that decisions dating back to Green v. T.A. Shoe-
maker & Co. 160 settled that Maryland allowed recovery for emotional 
151. 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); see supra text acco~panying notes 72-76. 
152. 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952). 
153. See e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 308, 379 P.2d 
519, 520, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40 (1963); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 472, 238 
A.2d 728, 729 (1968); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 681 (N.D. 
1972). 
154. Resavage, 199 Md. at 484-85, 86 A.2d at 881-82. 
155. /d. at 486, 86 A.2d at 882. 
156. [1925] I K.B. 141. 
157. Resavage, 199 Md. at 487, 86 A.2d at 883. 
158. /d. at 495, 86 A.2d at 887 (Delaplaine & Markell, J.J., dissenting). 
159. /d. at 497-98, 86 A.2d at 888. In addition to Bowman, the dissent cited two other 
decisions: Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Great At!. & Pac. 
Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A.2d 22 (1931). InRoch, a store manager sent 
a package containing a dead rodent to a nervous woman customer. Although an 
employee intentionally placed the dead animal in the package, the court went to 
great length to allow the case to go to the jury on a negligent mistake theory. The 
dissent in Resavage argued that the court's decision was inconsistent with Roch 
since the court found that a duty existed in the latter but not in the former. /d. at 
495, 86 A.2d at 887 (Delaplaine & Markell, J.J., dissenting). 
Mahnke involved particularly gruesome facts. In that case a young child saw 
her father fatally shoot her mother. Her father confined her in the same room 
with the corpse for six days. Thereafter the child's father committed suicide in her 
presence and, in the process, drenched her in his blood. The Resavage dissent 
conceded that Mahnke was perhaps distinguishable since it involved intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress, but stated that, at least with respect to willfulness, 
little difference existed between homicide with a gun and homicide by automo-
bile. /d. at 496-97, 86 A.2d at 887 (Delaplaine & Markell, J.J., dissenting). 
160. Ill Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909). 
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injuries when proximately caused and foreseeable by the defendant. 161 
The dissent also believed that the ~lainti.trs fear in Bowman, or possi-
bility of fear, was not dispostive. 16 
Since Resavage, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not been 
presented with analogous facts. 163 In .Dagiforde v. Potomac Edison 
Co., 164 the issue of bystander recovery was not squarely before the 
court of special appeals since the plaintiffs failed to prove negligence. 
Consequently, the .Dagiforde court expressed no opinion as to whether 
a person outside the zone could maintain an action. 165 
III. ANALYSIS AND PROJECTION 
A. National Trends 
Although it has perservered for nearly a hundred years, the impact 
rule is all but extinct today. Missouri and Illinois recently abandoned 
the impact rule, 166 and it is presently under review by the Supreme 
Court of Florida. 167 At present, only three states adhere to the rule, 168 
and of these Kentucky recently defined impact to include the taking of 
x-rays. 169 The rule is neither practical nor logical. Those states that 
have discontinued the rule have seen no real increase in litigation. 170 
In addition, the existence of impact neither makes an emotional injury 
more proximately caused nor easier for the jury to determine damages. 
The continued existence of the rule is largely due to a strong desire to 
adhere to precedent rather than a defense of its merits. Under the 
weight of almost unanimous disapproval it seems likely that the impact 
rule will soon disappear entirely. 
Though the complete demise of the impact rule seems imminent, 
continued controversy exists between the zone of danger and foresee-
ability rules. The foreseeability standard, while the minority approach, 
represents an unmistakable and perhaps irresistible trend since the 
arguments for retaining the zone of danger rule in bystander cases sim-
ply appear invalid. 
The first argument in support of the zone of danger rule is that the 
161. Resavage, 199 Md. at 489, 86 A.2d at 884 (Delaplaine & Markell, J.J., dissenting). 
162. Id. at 492, 86 A.2d. at 885. 
163. q. White v. Diamond, 390 F. Supp. 867, 873 (D. Md. 1974) (federal district court 
remarked that Maryland's law was clear and dismissed the complaint involving a 
plaintiff outside the zone of danger). 
164. 35 Md. App. at 37, 369 A.2d at 93 (1977). 
165. /d. at 44, 369 A.2d at 97. 
166. The impact rule was abandoned in Illinois in Rickey v. Chicago Trans. Auth., 98 
Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983), and in Missouri in Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 
S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983). 
167. Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348 (Fla. App. 1982), appeal docketed, l~o. 62,830 
(Fla. Nov. 5, 1982). 
168. See supra note 64. 
169. Deutsch v. Schein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980). The Kentucky court's approach is 
unsatisfactory since it reflects an obvious displeasure with the impact rule. 
170. See McNiece, supra note 41, at 41 n.l02. 
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emotionally injured bystander is an unforeseeable plaintiff. The zone 
of danger rule was predicated on the assumption that emotional harm 
is unlikely to be suffered by a person who does not fear for his own 
safety. While generally true, the application of this proposition to by-
stander cases is unwarranted. A mother who watches her child struck 
by an automobile may fear solely for the child, regardless of whether 
the mother is in the zone of physical danger. Therefore, no sound rea-
son exists to hold that a bystander is unforeseeable as a matter of law. 
Cases, such as Waube v. Warrington 171 and Resavage v. JJavies, 172 that 
have relied on Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad173 in holding an emo-
tionally injured bystander to be unforeseeable as a matter of law, have 
misinterpreted Palsgraf's conception of duty. In Palsgraf, the defend-
ant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff because her presence was unfore-
seeable. While an emotionally injured bystander may very well be 
unforeseeable, it does not follow that this will always be so. A case-by-
case approach based on foreseeability would allow a plaintiff to present 
his case and have a jury decide whether the defendant's conduct cre-
ated an unreasonable risk of emotional harm. 
The second and most frequently offered reason in support of the 
zone of danger rule is that as a policy no duty should extend to a plain-
tiff outside the zone. The same policy considerations that led states to 
abolish the impact rule, however, appear to be equally unsupportive of 
the zone of danger rule. Medical science has advanced to the point that 
it is increasingly difficult for a plaintiff to falsify a claim for emotional 
injury. 174 When an emotional injury exists, a plaintiff can prove its 
causal connection to a negligent act with reasonable certainty. 175 An 
adoption of the foreseeability approach would allow the plaintiff to 
prove the extent and source of his injury. States that have followed the 
foreseeability rule have not experienced a significant increase in litiga-
tion and liability has been reasonably circumscribed. 176 
Fears of unlimited liability have not been confined to those states 
that follow the impact or zone of danger rules. The majority of states 
that have adopted the foreseeability approach since JJillon v. Legg have 
fashioned its "factors" 177 in determining foreseeability into strict re-
quirements.178 While factors such as location near the scene of an acci-
dent, contemporaneous observance of the accident, and a close relation 
to the victim are all highly relevant in bystander cases, they should not 
be inflexibly applied when the facts of a particular case warrant other-
171. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). 
172. 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952). 
173. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
174. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 159-62, 404 A.2d 672, 679-80 (1979). 
175. Id. at 158-60, 404 A.2d at 678-79. 
176. See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 565, 632 P.2d 1066, 
1071 (1981); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 169-73, 404 A.2d 672, 684-86 (1979). 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04. 
178. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
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wise. An immediate trend toward the Dziokonski v. Babineau 179 ver-
sion of the foreseeability standard where the "Dillon requirements" 
were not applied, is questionable, however. Although Massachusetts 
later reaffirmed Dziokonski, 180 Hawaii 181 has been the only other fore-
seeability rule jurisdiction to forego the Dillon approach. As for those 
states that follow the impact or zone of danger rules, although it is un-
likely that they will make a quantum leap to the Dziokonski approach, 
they will likely adopt the Dillon approach. 
In addition to the arbitrary criteria of the impact and zone of dan-
ger rules, courts should also abolish the requirement of proof of a phys-
ical injury. Manifestations of a physical injury may be persuasive 
evidence of emotional distress, but it is not the exclusive or even neces-
sarily the best method of proof. Conceivably, it may be easier for a 
plaintiff in one case to prove his emotional injury through a lack of 
ability to cope with stress, than a plaintiff in another case where physi-
cal manifestations are present. Moreover, many states recognize the 
independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which 
does not require proof of physical injury. 182 There does not appear to 
be a valid distinction in the types of proof required when the conduct 
complained of is negligent rather than intentional, since the problems 
of proof are the same. 
B. Maryland Law 
Although Maryland follows the zone of danger rule, such a course 
was not inevitable. The Resavage court read Bowman very restric-
tively. Even if Bowman was grounded upon a duty theory as contended 
by the Resavage court, it is not immediately clear why a duty should 
extend to a plaintiff inside the safety of his home but not to a plaintiff 
standing on her porch. 183 Maryland law has traditionally been hostile 
179. 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). 
180. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980). 
For a discussion of Ferriter, see Note, The W!fo and Children Of an Injured Em-
ployee May Recover Damages from a Negligent Employer for Loss of Consortium 
and for Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress (/the Shock of Viewing the Injuries at 
the Hospital Shortly After the Accident Caused Substantial Physical Injury, Even 
Though the Employee Receives Workmen's Compensation Benefits, 50 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 237 ( 1981 ); Note, Expanding Loss of Parental Society and Negligent Infliction 
of Emotional Distress-Allowing Recovery Despite Worker's Compensation Exclu-
sive Remedy Provisions: Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., l3 U. ToL. L. 
REV. 1401 (1982). 
181. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Hawaii 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981). 
182. See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress: The Case for an Independ-
ent Tort, 59 GEo. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (1971). 
183. The Resavage court took a geographical approach to duty. It agreed that no duty 
should have existed in Waube since the plaintiff was not in the highway. See 
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). The court contrasted 
Waube to Spearman, where the plaintiff was in the highway. See Spearman v. 
McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912). The Resavage court, however, ig-
nored that the plaintiff in Spearman was not in the zone of danger, and that Spear-
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to the expediency reasons that underlie the zone of danger approach, 184 
and while Resavage remains the law, there are indications that Mary-
land may be headed toward a more liberal approach. For instance, in 
Vance v. Vance, 185 the husband left his wife and two children for an-
other woman after eighteen years of marriage. After the wife obtained 
a decree for alimony and child support, the husband filed a motion to 
strike the decree and annul the marriage on the ground that their mar-
riage was void since he was not divorced from his first wife at the time 
he married his present wife. The wife then brought suit against her 
husband for damages due to emotional distress as a result of her hus-
band's negligent misrepresentation concerning his marital status at the 
time of their marriage. The court discussed Maryland cases on negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress, including Green v. T.A. Shoemaker 
& Co 186 and Bowman v. Williams, 187 but curiously omitted Resavage v . 
.Davies. 188 The Vance court intimated that Maryland does not support 
the traditional policy reasons against recovery of damages based on 
emotional distress. 189 Although the facts of Vance are dissimilar to a 
bystander situation, the court could have used the same policy reasons 
relied upon by Resavage to deny liability. That the court treated the 
case as any other negligence action may suggest that Maryland will not 
follow the zone of danger rule in subsequent cases. Also, while Vance 
reaffirmed Bowman's requirement of a physical injury, it gave a liberal 
interpretation to the term "physical." 190 
man, contrary to the court's view, did not allow recovery on a concession of duty. 
For a discussion of Spearman, see supra note 77. The court in Resavage explained 
that the Supreme Court of Washington allowed recovery in a 1935 case because a 
mother was apprehensive that a runaway truck would strike her house and injure 
her son, as in Bowman. See Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578,47 
P.2d 1037 (1935). The Resavage court distinguished Frazee from Cote v. Litawa, 
96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950), where the accident occurred in front of the 
house, as in Resavage. 
184. See, e.g., Green v. T.A. Shoemaker & Co., Ill Md. 69, 81,73 A. 688,692 (1909) 
("[t]he argument from mere expediency cannot commend itself to a Court of jus-
tice, resulting in the denial of a logical legal right and remedy in all cases because 
in some a fictitious injury may be urged as a real one") (emphasis in original); 
Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 403-04, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933), supra note 47. 
185. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979). 
186. Ill Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909). 
187. 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933). 
188. 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952). 
189. Vance, 286 Md. at 499-500, 408 A.2d at 733. 
190. As the Vance court stated: 
We think it clear that Bowman provides that the requisite 'physical in-
jury' resulting from emotional distress may be proved in one of four 
ways. It appears that these alternatives were formulated with the overall 
purpose in mind of requiring objective evidence to guard against feigned 
claims. The first three categories pertain to manifestations of a physical 
injury through evidence of an external condition or by symptoms of a 
pathological or physiological state. Proof of a 'physical injury' is also 
permitted by evidence of a 'mental state,' a conclusion consistent with 
the holdings in the Green, Bowman and Roch cases. In the context of the 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The decisional law pertaining to negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, particularly bystander cases, illustrates what may happen 
when unnecessarily doctrinaire approaches, based on policy considera-
tions, are substituted for traditional negligence criteria. The adoption 
of arbitrary standards such as the impact and zone of danger rules were 
well-intentioned efforts at addressing fears of unlimited liability and 
false claims, but many deserving plaintiffs were left without a remedy, 
thus undermining the most fundamental premise of tort law-every 
wrong should have a remedy. Attempts to clarify the law, though, have 
met with stubborn and increasingly successful resistance. While fears 
of increased and contrived claims may be logical given the nature of 
the injury, these fears are unfounded. Courts that have recognized this 
proposition have relaxed rigid rules, but the foreseeability standard 
that has been substituted in their stead has not been completely free of 
arbitrary criteria. While certain factors, such as proximity to and ob-
servance of the accident, relationship to the victim, and physical symp-
toms, may be valuable indicia of the merits of a complaint, courts 
should not apply them so inflexibly as to preclude an otherwise prov-
able claim. 
The best approach may be to treat negligent infliction of emotional 
distress as any other negligence action, employing the criteria of fore-
seeability and proximate cause, keeping in mind the inherent difficul-
ties of proof of injury and extent of damages to be awarded. While it is 
difficult to determine the bounds of liability in emotional injury cases, 
the judicial problems in this regard are not unique to claims of emo-
tional harm and must be approached with both sensitivity and confi-
dence that justice will be done. Nor should the judiciary abdicate its 
function in favor oflegislative action. Too often a plaintiff is suspended 
between the court's refusal and the legislature's reluctance to address a 
controversial cause of action. Negligent infliction of emotional distress 
remains a common law tort action, and unless assumed by the legisla-
ture, the responsibility remains with the judiciary to decide the merits 
of a plaintiff's claim. This should be done on a case-by-case basis by 
using traditional tort concepts. 
Donald H Romano 
Bowman rule, therefore, the term 'physical' is not used in its ordinary 
dictionary sense. Instead, it is used to represent that the injury for which 
recovery sought is capable of objective determination. 
/d. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34 (note omitted). The court found that in addition to 
symptoms of an ulcer, the plaintiff had physical manifestations of a physical in-
jury as shown by her deteriorated physical appearance (unkempt hair, sunken 
cheeks, and dark eyes). /d. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734. Moreover, Vance held that 
the expert medical testimony is not a prerequisite for a cause of action for emo-
tional distress. /d. at 502-03, 408 A.2d at 734-35. 
